

RCA

Memo From

D. E. Wise

TO

Bill

LOCATION

DATE

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Dwise

WIENSCHER
WIENSCHER

"Interveiw we with ~~W/epc~~ Wienschler, (questionis garbled)

". . .now either our contract engineers you know, forced the contractors to do the same thing. So You might see any thing in our statures repeated, or maybe it was intelligent that the contractors preferred to do it the same way as well. This the assembly pictures for Saturn I , it is all g here , because we did development the Saturn I entirely in-house . And after we had the ten Saturn I's we ~~counted/all~~ turned it over to Chrysler, so they came in a little bit too late to do any devlopment.."

"Did this tooling and the pictures and stuff go down to Miss U. then?"

"Yeah. We delivered to Miss. U. and they might have been another set for that. But I mean they did it exactly as a production contract, getting the complete set of drawings and everything because if you built already ten vehicles and then built another ten it was as a complete sub-contractor^{ing} of a developed uni_____

They made some modifications, for thair requirements on weight saving, which we had started to develop here ."

"Was the weight saving program going on all through the development ~~side~~ ^{cycle} as you found new ways of doing things, would you modify each vehicle as you went along?"

"Yeah, actually the OND of the research and devlepmnt was always justified and only possible on that basis to be funded ~~fronted~~ . To say we have our present vehicle in development it es already maybe in the product development , so that the points are already made sothat the motors or the configuration is frozen. But it could be that we have to save weight, for, instance especially in the Saturn V that may be the lunar pay-

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load exceeds the limits and then somebody else has to make up for it and that could be to make the first stage lighter, make the second stage lighter and so on. So especially for the first stage, which we built here, the first four of the stages before going to the oval, they are, I personally run a large structural development program ~~and~~ ^{and} represents 30% ~~of~~ all of this ~~weight~~ structural weight. We never incorporated that program, we incorporated only a 20% tank weight saving, by introducing one of the modes which I developed. But the others was then to go from aluminum basic interior to advanced technology's using titanium ~~and~~ and using oil diffusion on the methods and changing the tank configurations. So . . ."

"Are you talking about the SIC now?"

"Yeah this the SIC. You might have seen this, you know we, that was in when . . . '65. . . this a NASA Memorandum. WE had one afternoon for manufacturing research and our work is hard that time, gave a short opening to and our people collected for it, the different activities we are doing and this was all in respect to technology development, working problems, this was ^{springtime} our electric Himmel development, which I introduced in Swinhimmel. . . yeah we have manufacturing researching support of Saturn V the h-forming was one of the major introductions. i In a nutshell, the Redstone and Jupiter Vehicle was a common-dome configuration. "

"You mean a dome with all kids on both ends four and one half?"

"Yeah. ^{normally} you have only two tanks _____ and the oxidizer and the one basic question in rocket building, that was, whether you make two tanks with the end ~~of~~ ^{of} six feet in-between so this here then the locks tank and this the fuse

tank and you have the end of ~~stage~~^{stage} in between, although you make one common container with a common dome and this is here then, let's say your field."

"Common bulk point."

"The end has points and still has the common bulk head. So had the Jupiter and the Redstone vehicle."

"Would you do that now, still use a common bulk head?"

"In the Saturn class we went to separate tanks. Saturn I because it had the blast-off tanks and it had one central lux and it had seven tanks around there with for more lux and four more tanks, so you had separate tanks. And then in the booster stage for the Saturn V we went to separate tanks."

"What about the F2 and the F4B . . ."

"The F4B has ~~come and gone~~^{a common dome} and the F2 has a common dome."

"Would you still build them with common bulk head if you were doing it all over again, or would you go to common tanks?"

"The bigger a vehicle gets the more impractical it gets to build the configuration in one piece. This is so, one factor is especially decided. Because if you have one large stovepipe to install the breakheads and that is 33 feet in diameter and 80 feet long, then it is much harder to handle, you need much higher facilities. There for instance, when you have to turn the stage upright there no plane crane is sufficient. And you can also only employ a small number of people, but if you break such a unit down into the two tanks, you can have two assembly lines parallel, you can live with your buildings. So I mean . . ."

"So that was one of the ~~reasons~~^{reasons} ~~for~~^{for} the FIC haveng the sepe~~rate~~^{rate} tanks?"

"That was the main reason, because everybody came and said

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why don't you do it in a common dome , because that's from the engineering, but if you would put . . . so more or less the beginners they finally repeated what we had done in the Redstone and Jupiter and tried to teach us , introduce the common o dome, while we moved away from that, because if we would have done the first stage in one piece we would have needed all new
????
paintings . And in fact this happened exactly with the S4B and and the S2 stage like in Seal Beach and in Huntington Beach we had hundreds of millions of dollars building projects with new high pay areas with no cranes and it was more crane clearances you know the so-called _____Tower in MissU Boeing proposed to devise such a _____Tower just to (unclear) While we build up the vehicles and had to sign it that way for cilibrial sections and there was one with the dome and one in between and one with the other t dome and these sections never exceeded the height of 04 40 feet o so we could use and actually force this into the c schème untill we had this we forced that the Shoe plan , which was the biggest national investment, I think it was ar at that time the biggest factory under cover in the whole world ., paid for by the navy and the Air Force Herald etc. And then we inhereted that and it would ahave been unusable you know if we would a have had the ot other beside s because it has 40 feet tanks ___ and this is what we had here. So we refused the need for hurting the buildings to the minimun, at least to chest l.

"And you had to argue with Boeing about this."

Oh yeah, they fought that for a long time you know to

soften up the management, the people who don't have any technical ideas and help them impose that it was payload and was not connected with the engineering reading program. You know it was really nonsense to put the Cp³ for the 2 stages which was another 56 million dollar investment, as much as I remember. As we put it on for the same reasons it doesn't make sense, any sense to fault a \$50 million dollar building program just because the designer built it that way. We didn't do it that way it is much harder to work with one bulk item than instead of ~~phone things~~ /????????????????? . It is, Valking decided against that because California needed construction work. I mean the money spending is only available because you have to keep the people busy, you have to ...

"That's one of the reasons why S21 wound up with the common bulk head."

Yeah. That means that we couldn't afford the building program going with it, it was rather even desired. Rather than build it in lengthwise, build it in symmetric sections. Now the symmetrical sections came, you know have one draw back, that means whenever you have such a divisional section and you weld it and you have longitudinal stiffening breaks they have some stiffening power in there. You have to leave a large piece of weld line where you joined with your welding, because if you change your thin skins here, there was no method known how to change the ribs, the ribs had to fit in picture, that didn't exist. So our design people said we will work in here again and redesign this thing with the wide weld, I developed here a technology program how to join the continuous _____ and-we-made and that saved 20% tank weight.

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That actually made the ~~horizontal~~ ^{horizontal} ~~assent~~ ^{essentially more} motive
even with the longitudinal assembly mode. I don't know how
technical you want to be in your book or what the purpose of it
is because this is internal ~~pressur~~ pressurization.

"No, listen we want to make it as technical as we can."

You know the hoop stress in the frontal method, the longitudinal hoop stress is twice as high vs the concentric hoop stress. So if you make the ventrator welds this was the area is half as stressed, vs the longitudinal welding area. So that is what you know for the moment we selected and that is another engineering problem because the aluminum welding for the vibrations. Now there are two things. If you went to the thick gauge joints, you know in all of your compensate in that weight area for the missing reptile then it wouldn't bother you there. We had to weld through about 1 to 2 inch of aluminum which at this time was not yet flexible. Basically the older types of vehicle, the Redstone and the Cubical was welded on 50 thousand series aluminum, 5 thousand series aluminum 54 56 that ~~is~~ ^{is} magnesium containing aluminum which were . That's the so called ^{seawater} Cwallier consistent type of aluminum. That is not effected by heat input with respect to strings, but it only ^{?????} is hardened by cold stretching, this is called workhardening. So that material was not used in the aircraft because it is hard to form as some as you shape it, it gets harder and harder and so ~~it~~ in order to make the intricate aircraft wing noses and wing tips, with deposing the 5 thousand series aluminum even if it is seawater

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consistent, that was the most unfavorable aluminum Allen could use and it didn't react to a heating. It had a high nose strength ~~an~~ level anyway. As an aircraft normally is welded as well as it because aluminum wasn't considered to be weldable anyway. Now when the ~~m~~ missile ^{production} construction came up in aluminum ~~you~~ you have to build pressure vessels and they have to be welded. So that was the new technology test to solve the welding problems in high strength or light weight structure because the pressure vessel isn't the major ^{the} major structure or portion of the whole missile. The missile, more or less, the Air frame is a pressure ratio.

"Did the Atlas ~~wa~~ use aluminum or is that stainless steel."
Stainless steel.

"What about the Thor?"

They used 20 ~~14~~ aluminum.

"O.K., so that was , was the Thor the first big missile that began to use this stuff?"

No, the Redstone was the first ~~mi~~ big missile, the Thor was the second. Then the Air Force came in and _____ repeating exactly the Tupador. It was the same engine, it was the same size, and the same performance, an exact duplication.

"What about the Waffle construction of the Thor? Was that ever used ~~ee~~ on the Jupiter or on any other missile after that flight?"

No. As it wasn't used in the SiC either. Of course the waffle pattern is not really the ^{optimum} optimum for this type structure.

"Well I was thinking in terms of the 3rd stage."

We had ^{not} longitudinal , yeah. There was a pattern we used

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in the S4B stage that was we used, also the S4B stage used a compliment of, it used the same _____ abd bulkhead method. We proceeded actally from the cover dome method where the dome was slipped into the brid. It was lead weilded here. You know intally you have your autobald and you have a certain step in strentgh anf and consistentecy from that accectplicity and whenever you weild such a coil you know where the whitehead shines here and you X ray it, you always see that making lines in your telescope where your bulkhead or your section is telescoped onto h the other one. You don't know whether this ~~crack~~ ^{CRACK} is a wield ~~crack~~ ^{CRACK}, somewhere in the weild or whether this is a crack were your structure starts to split. It is also a natural way of crack probogating cause. So that is the weakness of any such lap weild, whenever you weild some- ~~hi~~ thing together that way that you still have _____, which in fatigue life later will probably get a crack into the weild on one hand, on the other ha d in you quaility or rather humidity control program you can not ~~reall~~ clearly design, rather this is already a crack or it is just your telescoping. So we thought this pro- blem with the 5 thousand series aliumum, I mean we used the 5 thousand series aliumum because they were not insensitive and for that reason you could weild it and you didn't lose much strength. But they didn't reach the strength weight ration of the thermal treatment aluinum, like the 20 thousand series of copper content. But when the technology progressed you knw the automatically con- trolled _____ methods through the development of completely automated inert gsa and ~~methods~~ ^{metals}, controlled withall types of electric sensor systems, and really the weighting machine is absolutely a very highly automated thing. We have spent many hundreds of millions here, in our lab, for development of

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of weighting technology. You have my deep dimensional contributions in that area for the general technology. Now after LSA meeting we worked hard on this 5 thousand series aluminum for really the structural weight application, I mean not just for a beer can, we progressed into the 20 thousand, which was used by four also, but 24 feet is a ^{?feen 4} 20% cover. So whenever you weld this the 24 feet ^{? team} it was king in strength of weight ratio " 24 team fully heat treated it was about 20% better than the 5,5456 or so. But the way the building was modulated caused us that 4% cover. And so you have so called microofficials and cover completed areas because as soon as you nickly that the cover just ~~turns~~ ^{concentrates} to a utectic and you have in areas the copper content is lost and then you have ~~no~~ soft aluminum ~~property~~ property. So the big problem in 20-14 welding still exists and it has existed throughout the Saturn program. Twenty fourteen was then used for the S4B stage and it was used for the S2 stage. But the S4B stage was contracted out first to Douglas and they had recommended 20-14 and they had done the mat welding method like this shifted in ~~bulkheads~~ there under _____ as we had done it with the 5000 series with Redstone and Jupiter. a And they used also this type of technology they did not go to Butweld^{?????}. You know of course the better joining method is if you really can control your weldment to butweld, so that you get a continous configuration."

"And you can check the crack structure much better too."

"And you can absolutely control it so the more aligned the weld, the more sound principle is butweld. But in aluminum we didn't think of as the early tubicle vehicle to do that, as for B stage we didn't do it and we didn't think of even in the Saturn program to do it with a cover containeng material.

Because that was horribly weld . Sothe strenght th to weight ratio
 advantage of going to the 20,000 series cover containin alloys
 was like in the S4B completely wiped out by still resorting to t
 the old level technology and applying a much higher safety ratio.
 Sothe Douglas ~~ways~~^{welds} are only loaded to 20% of their capable weight
 strength for uncertainty reasons and safety reasons inherent
 in that _____ weighting problems. Now we used here at Marshall
 neverthe less a cover containig alloyb but that was the 22-I9
 which is a six person cover alloy, and which wasn't considered
 to be weightable at that time. Which is in fact the old I909
 door aluminum alloy where the first airships were built from.
 This was the two highest strength aluminum alloy for six% cover
 which is a new tactic point within the cover aluminum. And Alcoa
 in their Canadian plant had taken up this dual-aluminum pro-
 duction , I don't know some years ago, and they had verified
 the alloy a little bit , you know with more ingre dients and
 really this whole thing is like cooking, in fact we hire
 metalogists^{is} who~~s~~ ~~are~~ 25 years with Alcoa, who is a spinster
 had printing , and she's now over there materials, so she's a
 good cook and she's a good ~~material~~^{aluminum} maker because you have about
 6,7,8, ingredients and you put a~~l~~ little bit salt in it and you
 know what happens you try it out. So Alcoa actually improved
 the ultimate dual by some small fractional per cent of some ingre-
 dients especially titanium. To make the welding feasible, and in
 fact Boeing pioneered this use of a 6% cover alloy,22*I9 ,with
 their Boe Mark Missile. They had a thirty inch diameter tank in
 the BoeMark, 30 inch, just allittle bit more than two feet and
 thatwas 22-I9, and that was welded up in butweld. And we went
 there o to see _____ that must have been in I960 or '59, and

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studied that. And finally after ~~many~~ maybe one a or one and a half years of better launch ___ and weight development selected this for the SIC stage. To date 22-19 is the only considered ~~to~~ aluminum alloy for any future space vehicles. Twenty fourteen is really on the way out because with that critical behavior with 4% and unreactive and so on. Now the interesting factor, the strength to weight ratio I mean the ~~whole~~ ^{5-4 strength to weight} ~~the whole~~ flight and aircraft, a materialwise higher strength to weight ratio at the joining I mean like welding, now this 20-14 which was developed not for welding but for strength in strength to weight and which is used in aircraft, which is a heat treated alloy. Whenever ~~you~~ ___ it, it gets soft like cardboard, so you can form it, and then you age it again and it gets really strength to weight ratio of 20% better than any other alloy. You know that for being relative to for being relative to ___ and not welded, that is still up to date topnotch aircraft. It was, so ~~was~~ the old deal aluminum which was the ~~airship~~ ^{Gentle} airship and let's say the first world war general lin aluminums being 20% lower than 20-14, that got more out of fession. That got out of fession. But the Alcola development, heat development out of that alloy, yielded a combined heat treatment, a combined treatment. That was the over mat of, heat treatment was a cold work at which you had to stretch, you would weild the 5 thousand series and also the find the 5 thousand series because all of these are stronger and harder cold working it and maybe stretching it. It didn't react to any heat treatment at first chilling, the cover containing alloys they reacted to the heat treatment in order to harden or soften them. Now the combination of that, and that was really the major

discovery that to stretch the 22-19, the 60% copper alloy, to stretch it 10% and then you heat treat it, that increased the strength by about 20% and that part is 22-19 alloy. Exactly in the competitive range to 24P. So that was the, really the big technological breakthrough to have a double drink, which also would naturally would make it a little harder to work with than the other areas. But it is double worth it.

"There was a controversy, as I recall, or at least some discussion about the difference between ^{TIG} pig welding and mig welding in Dallas. Could you comment about that a little bit?" "They wanted to keep on using the mig weld as I recall and you couldn't see why they just wouldn't go ahead and some tape welding especially on the S4B?"

The reason or the underlying reason is that the Douglas design and mode of operation is conservative. They maintained there S4B welding and the whole S4B structure remote basically to sell our technology and they did all the welding downhand. That means whenever we welded something we put it on in to horizontal position, they didn't weld in place and so weld puzzle by cavity just was well in its way and you could make very big welds for instance in one pass in order to fill the big gaps or so bigger materials. We got a higher degree of yielding but also there is structure in the approach was just to use the weld with 20% of there carrying capability. So they were really conservative in their engineering requirements, they were really conservative in there welding approach by welding everything downhand and they didn't proceed to bud welds so that they

could live for relatively plentive over this conventional
loads.. They also used for instance circluary bulkheads which
are not weight optimum therefore the presure ratio the end closure
is not as heavy as fiel. That would be the lightest bulkhead that
you can build, because the shpereical thime this already have the
ball thickness of the clinder one. It's just a basic log . Now,
but whenever you connect this to some other force of the vehicle
you have to put up a scale here and this scale of planes is
naturally also a little longer than the radius of the shpere.
So that you can continue with the empliments in design. So the
total weight speration for that and is the bulkhead weight plus
the skill rate. And ther you find out whenever you make a lithical
bulkhead, which is only 70% high, which is allops one over .2 ratio
the long vs the small radius, then this area gets a little bit
bigger and long but your scale gets 30% shorter and becasue the
pressure ratio gauge is all determined by the inside pressure,
are more or less not like if anything in long while the longit-
adan force transmission you know really puts the weight into the
scales. The major weight loss actaully in the unpresurized scale
structures and in the ___ scale structures. You ~~openise~~ optimize
your structure by ~~joining~~ to a lithical bulkhead and that was
one of my structure and developement things together with indus-
try research to figure out what was the optomum end, tank end plus
scale. So in all the vehicles in the S2 stage and in the Nova S1
we introduced it in our S1c stage we proceeded to a lithical bulk-
head which was 1/2 for 70% raduis proportion. Which means a

little bit more cooling to make the bulkhead, but after the bulkhead also big you even mighten have know that this is not a hemisphere. But it is a very essential weight saving , it is a much more essential approach. Everybody does it now , the 2 stage does it as well. But Douglas stuck to the , even knowing that this stuck in their proportunal hemeshpere bulkheads and also they their covering dome in there has the same raduis so that they would use 12 for making thatbulkhead. That, you know so from that stage simplicity and cut defect or from conventinal playing x it safe reasons, high safety factors and it was using hemeshpereical bulheads and now they someway got a contract becasue I mean they developed to much cheaper, they played it sage and someway made it. But this are the weaknesses of that stage. the stage is not optimum, it has optimum materials but it is not used enough that the configurations enough in the weight chose.

"Is part of that though becasue the S4 and the S4B stage were kind of the first of thd major S~~4~~ Saturn structures?"

Yea.

"So that Douglas esentially at the beginning of the technological ~~a-lat~~ ladder the S2 and the S1 series ..."

They continued the Redstone Jupiter technology, which they had picked up in the 4 structure and they continued it and because of that optimized this. They, weight and lauchh technological contributions is the inside insulation of the tank because the Hydro G was a ~~new~~ novelty. They had also in there common dome another structure troubles becasue of that relatively unsound structural

approach. That was in effect this tank in here sits in the other tank front and this joined, you know that was the problem area which cost many many millions to rectify. And this stimilary means structure has no vehicle which doesn't have the certain defencienies in them. I mean meanwhile we used, it preforms but any time that could be a mojour catastrophy for us. I don't want to medily to you, I mean nothing is perfect but this was one area where alot of improvement had to be made reduced even to be accepeted. We have spent many, many millions here on all of that with Douglas in order to improve the technology.

"Is the North American common bulkhead with the J ring comming down and the hydrogen tank sifting in there, is that a different configuration?"

Absolutely! Becasue, when the 2 stage was going up for open bid, ~~th~~ North American was doing the following: They said 22-9 and 20-14 is superior ~~to~~ in strength to weight ratio to any other material at that time. Second, the Douglas uses it and successfully weilds it. The thrid things that American said was OK if Douglas can weild that material than we in any case can do as well or even better and the ^{pointrest} in their configuration from lap joins to bud joins with that material, which turned out later to be a major cost consuming item. Then they had to, we was then togetherfied and had to solve the unsolveable problem of anking the higher the ^{landng} rate join. Also the struss people said, if Douglas has a 80% safety option in their weild in order to dominant all type of small defeciences in that tickleless material, then we can get up to 50% safety factos.

So that weilding results was at the same time probosaic require-
ments. So they had to do better, they had to, that really was
the big opstet and the delay in the 2 stage production becasuse
of the optomistic, that's the design idea if Douglas can do it,
we can do better and really know what we were talking about.

At that time the aircraft companys never weilded alumiumm anyway.
We had a, they had a small prone which was once weilded in 20-14
therefore, I think 20 ... I mean what happened was the extra pro-
lasion of the structural experiences that the alumiumm riding
from the fullmark tank to the SLC33 full tank and in North American
from their 15 inch weapons system to the series with the stage.
That is what he calls a lot of pitfalls which in technology judge-
ment have alot of to later be developed. But otherwise we had
2 stage use completely the structural principle of the SLC stage
abd the electrical bulkheads we type of stiffness which longi-
tudanal T stiffness instead of the old waffle patern and I figure
theat out here also a person , this sounds a little bit funny, but
this is not him. You know I'm an aircraft designer and test
pilot . I'm trained in optimization⁰⁵ structures and when I converted
half of the 66 really, I feel that this , that we don't really
have to much work but there is the missile thing going up and in
New Mexico, if you go there you cna see there from here and just
throught the foot pond system, they have nothing to do anyway.
Which was the Air Force mode of operation, they have thier own
mission developements and the SPL did everything, made decisions
for the guidance , we didn't even get to the parts. So it was a-

all done by the Air Force sub contractors, that was their mode of operation. So they had one that left there and came here. But, ~~we~~ the missile design was way off, ^{were not ~~missile~~ with the} not final air but aircraft and lightweight structures and in fact by Dr. Von Bruen and other leading people the structural deficiency wasn't considered to be very important. In tone that it isn't our, the developments in the first place, the developemnts of the engines that we worked in producing the thrust, and they guidance and control systems that this thing didn't fall back on your head. With long beam in between, that was a plumbers job and nit nobody cared about that and that was the first order of technology criteria. When I came here the Redstone and the Jupiter and the Saturn I came about and the vehicle payload performance was improved. It was always done by making the tanks longer.

"Just add more fuel."

YEah. Add more fuel and you get more of an impulse. You know it was really the lower efficient way and was not really the most clever way to gain more payload by refining your basically crude mission structures. That only comes about now with the space shuttle where this thing has to fly as well. But ~~that~~ as long as your expendable you know that the structure or refinement requirement is not the first of the requirements. This is actually the basic difference between aircraft and rocket technology, especially the technology of a expendable rockets. All our wiehgt improvement justifications , you know when I came here and I saw , they are building thier plumbing team camps as ~~wellas~~ with no regard to basic refined lightweight sturture technology which was already very well known for the aircraft, you know first you'd thing they are stupid and then you find out that they are not so stupid after

all that is just the law, the difference between aircraft and missile.

"It's a trade-off ~~sti~~ situation ."

Yeah the trade-off and it is not to clever to goldplate something which you don't have to goldplate. The emphasis on engines you know and on guidance and control systems finally lead to the perfection so, sense about 5 years you can fly a guidance and control system maybe through interesting catalogues. I mean Sears doesn't deal yet with that guidance and control systems, but they will as soon as the demand increases. So I mean with this technology wise this was solved around, atleast it was after the 70's. It was after 1965. To the perfection of reliability of lifetime to be operatable for a couple a of years even for Mars mission and so on. Which was found to be impossible twenty years i earlier. And the engine technolgy which also was in the ~~bb~~ beginning just a three minutes affair and you were happy if it wint three minutes at h that because it was dumped anyway. You know that was extended especially through the S3B engine and the rocket time warehouse which is the central one, you know, we call it the rocket time warehouse, because it's a warehouse for i engines. (missing) . . . rocket and aircraft technology and because I came from one side and essential penetrated to another and had not participated in the actual rocket development I can see pretty clearly or what we really are doing is working out the possibilities, after the engine and guidance technology is more or less over the hump. The next step to optimize the structural technology. . .

"The structural technologies are still catching up in a sense."

"And this is now the major problem, because of the spacial recovery, this means you have to learn how to build a pressure level

let me say that the major portion of a missile structure or a rocket structure is the tank. The major portion of the aircraft structure are the wings . So if you want to build a cross pleat you have to get the wing requirement or the aerodynamic requirement together with the buzshawitel requirement. And that is exactly the developmental work which I started then in the '60's and that was the development of intersecting buzshawitels. Because there is one beautiful natural _____ and this is now the base of life called shuttle technology. That means that several few facts a certain liquid into one pressure level or a number of small ones the rate of the shell is constant, that's a natural law . . .

"Does it work for the Saturn I as well?"

"Yeah, it doesn't matter whether you cluster or whether you put in one tank, the weight saving is only inside . But the real clue is because the wall thickness depends on the ~~r/r~~ ^{radius} , the radius is directly proportionate to the wall fr figures that means if you make the radius smaller than the wall figures are smaller and then the shell weight is constant. That is even true whenever you intersect the pressure if you intersect pressure _____ the intersect you mainly get hanging on you know and you get this mighty cellular proper names structures which are used By _____ & _____ for building big project levels , you know you have seen these ~~r/r~~ color tanks / technology Now this color tank so the intersecting project level ~~r/r~~ to cover with the aero-dynamic requirements that gives you the cross breed that means for no weight loss in your structural shaping you can the full pressurized structure to your other demands That is then the old-fashioned rocket. Which has multi-cell fuel tank multi-cell lux tank which has vantarelel tanks instead of stacked up tanks with a big suction lines penetrating , you n know , we had

upper
the other tanks, the lower tanks the suction lines going through
the tanks which is really a pain in the neck. Here you have short
suction lines you have a simple thrust structure you know, but this
is improved maybe steered time rocket, this is for the rocket
people. Then where the gimble turns off you have the main
spaw, you attach your wings, now your wings this is the
aircraft structure with effective landing gear and then you have
your engine package which is another inter-face package, and that to-
gether makes a re-usable rocket. You know this is before F-I engines
that's good enough for the shuttle, this is F-I you can see if you
take hydrogen engines you know they make sure little people or propulsion
people, because propulsion was the major development here, for
guidance and control people there were not many structural people
involved, because everybody could do it. Now making that an air-
craft it's different. If you want a propulsion point of view
decide for the best engine, and the best engine was the hydrogen
fuel engine. Then you disagree because hydrogen uses two and half
to three times the storage volume its light and this is the size
of the _____ and this is the size of the orbit just to get the hyd
hydrogen in there. But if you use the fuel the kerosene which is 20
?????
times denser than the energy of the fuel then your tank gets so small
and your booster gets much smaller for the same size. That means
while here the specific impulse of the not-fuel engine is making 30%
more this is the hydrogen engine your structure is only half as big
and your structural savings ~~of~~ ^{and} the total operational behavior
overrides by far the selection of the propulsion system from a specific
interest point of view. Now if you see the whole thing that's what
you get and what really happens is there's now a big cover on . . .

"That's what I'm gonna ask you because all the pictures and models

I've seen are more or less these huge thing here rather than hte the lighter one but tey are coming around to this finally . . "

"Yes this is two years old but now it's really invented by everybody but I mean that they are rnot yet formed , you know we don't put out any configuration, you know we are a govern- ment agency and we just do the impossible and the industry does the possbile and we shouldn't really do the work of industries.

And so the mode of operation is to wait until you get the responses ^{fertalize} you only finalize the idea by giving it everything you know until you get around to something which is accepted. And this interation and this _____ has been going onthe last couple of the years we have spent several billion dollars just on educational program . Which is the purpose of the NASA program I mean we are not building the vehicles just to play with them, I mean this is work and technology eh. . development reasons . So it's like a big manastary you know , you have really nothing accomplished you pray three times a day and while we pray in vl volume it's the same thing like l sticking you in the middle of an monastery and inventing the flight power because we have nothing else to do, in between prayers. So that is deliberate . . people have to invent it up some way and after it's not satisfactory you just consume that is more satisfactory to create uh . . it's horrible if you just consume gasoline and car tires you know, . It's easier for people to a say I did my day's work and now I even pray and you are more satisfied fo from that, that's really the underlined causes, So I mean we have to create a program that has a large creative challenge and spread it out, and that's exactly what we are doing . So if you say that'sthe way to to go that's the old generation way to say it, you have to go through all thinkabae considerations and do it the hard way. Because if you don't^{do} it

the hard way you are not learning anything. So this is the battles we have to fight. If we would say just tell us we can build a booster it's very similar to that one you know we might have another SST program, It might not even be complete. But if you build up a national program for 20 billion dollars they effort is not bigger s as you ge t 20 million. So you have ot go out for a bigger package, which is much larger and much longer if you get that total it's more efficient as if you do in piecemeal. And we have to look at the totla thing , we have to think big and not just think in certain specific practical solutions. And if something is done the wrong way that is really stimulating technology because we are because he didn't know that the holes were ~~from~~ ^{round} so he put square holes in . Then the manufacturing ^{ists} technology develop machine to make square holes you know with electro machines. So that was maybe the stupid portion of it but the next generation of engineers are using now the square hole in a very refined mode na and we have big instruments suddenly you know. And learning is only possible by doing something wrong otherwise if you know it already you don't learn anything. You know that the challenge and the solution overwh elm your capability for awhile and then the next generation of engineers and scientists they have enough reason to be creative and solve the ^{where} problem. So if we don't have the weapon system and development program where we have to feel the need , we have the technology program where the space objective is only one of the re asons to develop the problems. And the problems must be very dimanding with respect to the solutions , and it must keep our nation busy. So this where you get to because it sounds pretty funny that I say we wouldn't know how to do it . And we don't have to say Monday on the booster you know "